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KNOWING IS HALF THE BATTLE: A PROPOSAL FOR
PROSPECTIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS IN JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS
Jordan M Singer*
This article proposes a two-pronged, comprehensive approach to pro-
viding proper, relevant information to voters on candidates in contested
judicial elections. Every sitting judge seeking reelection would be subject to
judicial performance evaluation (JPE), a neutral review of the judge's skills
related to the process of judging that considers the judge's impartiality, case
management skills, communication skills, command of substantive and pro-
cedural law, temperament on the bench, and commitment to public service.
At the same time, candidates without prior judicial experience would be
subject to a parallel review called prospective performance evaluation
(PPE), which would examine their applicable skills and experience using
virtually identical criteria. A diverse evaluation committee would collect
and analyze the relevant data for both sitting and aspiring judges, and the
data and analysis for each candidate would be disseminated to voters before
the election. Collectively, these evaluations would afford voters in states
with contested judicial elections adequate, reliable, relevant information on
the candidates, allowing them to make more informed choices for judicial
office.
The article unfolds in three parts. Part I looks at the current state of
contested judicial elections and explores the consequences of voters lacking
sufficient, relevant information about judicial candidates. Part II examines
existing methods for collecting and analyzing relevant data on judges, both
with respect to sitting judges seeking retention and to nominees seeking a
new appointment to fill a vacancy on the bench. Part III describes a proposal
for prospective performance evaluations as a means of providing accurate,
relevant information on judicial candidates directly to voters.
* Director of Research, Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System,
University of Denver. J.D., Harvard Law School; A.B., Harvard College. The author would
like to thank Michael Buchanan, Pamela Gagel, and Rebecca Love Kourlis for their though-
tful comments on earlier drafts of this article. The Institute is a national, non-partisan legal
reform organization whose primary mission is to provide innovative and results-oriented
recommendations for the improvement of America's courts.
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I. THE UNINFORMED VOTER
Thirty-three states choose some or all of their judges through contested
popular elections.' But judicial races generally draw less attention than races
for prominent executive or legislative positions,2 and when judicial races do
draw attention it is often because partisan political issues highlight the cam-
paign. As a result, less information is generally available on judicial candi-
dates than for candidates in other races, and what information is available is
often unreliable or colored with a heavily partisan tint. Accordingly, all too
frequently voters are confronted at the polls with an "information problem":
they face a slate of judicial candidates about which they know nothing par-
ticularly relevant, or even nothing at all.
A. Lack of Quality Information
The "information problem" in contested judicial elections consists of
two separate but related problems. First, voters face an ongoing lack of rele-
vant information on the candidates-that is, information that emphasizes the
candidates' qualifications with respect to the proper role of a judge. Data
and neutral analyses of each candidate's experience and skills related to the
process of judging-such as the candidate's ability to manage a heavy ca-
seload, move nimbly across different areas of law, and treat all parties with
dignity and without bias-are all too frequently unavailable or ignored in
the course of an election. In 2004, for example, less than one-third of all
television advertisements in races for state highest courts focused on the
candidates' qualifications, experience, and integrity.3 Instead, campaign ads
emphasized negative qualities of the opposition-the number of negative
television ads nearly doubled from 2000 to 2004-or the candidate's own
qualities that were plainly irrelevant to the application of existing law or
even the holding ofjudicial office, such as the candidate's nickname.4
1. These states include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dako-
ta, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
2. See Anca Cornis-Pop, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and the Announce
Clause in Light of Theories of Judge and Voter Decisionmaking: With Strategic Judges and
Rational Voters, the Supreme Court Was Right to Strike Down the Clause, 40 WILLAMETTE
L. REv. 123, 168 (2004) (noting that "[j]udicial elections have traditionally been low sa-
lience, with poor voter turnout and little media attention.").
3. DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004, vii
(2005).
4. See Gary C. Byrne & J. Kristian Pueschel, But Who Should I Vote for For County
Coroner? 36 J. POL. 778, 783 (1974) (concluding in a California study that "candidates who
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Lack of quality information about judicial candidates has several re-
lated consequences. First, it contributes to diminished voter turnout in judi-
cial elections. Under a well-documented phenomenon known as "roll-off,"
voters cast votes for offices at the top of the ballot (such as President or
Governor) but decline to vote for offices lower down on the ballot. The roll-
off effect is particularly strong in judicial elections.' Between 1980 and
1995, about one-fourth of those who went to the polls skipped voting for a
supreme court seat.6 For lower-level judgeships, the lack of voter interest is
even more pronounced.' In the 2002 judicial elections in New York, for
example, voter participation in elections for civil court judges was no higher
than 22% in any of the four counties encompassing New York City
The decision not to vote cannot be attributed merely to general voter
apathy. Rather, a significant portion of votes not cast in judicial elections
results from voters' rational conclusion that they lack sufficient knowledge
to cast an informed vote. A 2004 study of New York voting habits con-
cluded that nearly 60% of voters did not vote in that state's partisan judicial
elections specifically because they lacked information about the candidates. 9
Another study of judicial elections in Wyoming found that nearly one-third
of voters who lacked information on a justice standing for retention chose
not to vote or could not recall their vote when asked.'0
Diminished voter turnout means that judges are chosen by only a small
fraction of eligible voters. Even worse, many of those who do vote base
their decisions on factors utterly unrelated to the candidate's ability to per-
form judicial work. Instead, voters cast their ballots based on factors such as
use a nickname [on the ballot] have an enormous 79 percent advantage over those who do
not."). But see Rebecca Wiseman, So You Want to Stay a Judge: Name and Politics of the
Moment May Decide Your Future, 18 J.L. & POL. 643, 663 (2002) (noting that in judicial
retention elections, the use of a nickname on the ballot did not have a statistically significant
effect for justices such as Orville "Jack" Armstrong and Daniel M. "Mike" Hanlon who had
emphasized their nicknames for voters).
5. See Steven Zeidman, To Elect or Not To Elect: A Case Study of Judicial Selection in
New York City 1977-2002, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791, 822-23 (2004); Nicholas P. Lo-
vrich et al., Citizen Knowledge and Voting in Judicial Elections, 73 JUDICATURE 28, 30
(1989).
6. Lawrence Baum, Judicial Elections and Judicial Independence: The Voter's Pers-
pective, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 19 (2003).
7. Id. at 20.
8. See Zeidman, supra note 5, at 823-35.
9. See Report of the Commission to Promote Public Confidence in Judicial Elections
38 (2004) (on file with author), available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reports/JudicialElectionsReport.pdf [hereinafter Feerick Com-
mission Report].
10. See Kenyon N. Griffin & Michael J. Horan, Patterns of Voting Behavior in Judicial
Retention Elections for Supreme Court Justices in Wyoming, 67 JUDICATURE 68, 72 (1983).
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the candidate's ethnicity," gender, 2 name, 3 party affiliation, 4 or length of
time on the bench. 5 Furthermore, a significant number of voters apparently
cast a vote without any rationale whatsoever. In one study, 38% of those
surveyed who had just cast a vote could not articulate a reason why they had
voted the way they did."
B. The Growth of Bad Information
The second, and more disturbing, aspect of the "information problem"
is the growing tendency of voters to be exposed to bad information on judi-
cial candidates. Here "bad information" means content that states or implies
that the judicial candidate, upon ascending the bench, will act in a way that
is inconsistent with the role and responsibilities of a neutral arbiter beholden
to the rule of law. As the Florida Supreme Court recently noted:
[J]udicial elections present a great risk-a risk that the public will be mi-
sinformed about the proper role and responsibilities of judges and that
because of that misinformation, confidence in our justice system will be
undermined or shaken if the public perception is that judges may act in a
partisan manner-rather than strictly adhere to the Rule of Law. 17
11. See Larry Aspin et al., Thirty Years of Judicial Retention Elections: An Update, 37
Soc. Sci. J. 1, 3 (2000). See also Susannah A. Nesmith, 16 Judge Seats Draw 35 Candidates,
MIAMI HERALD, Sep. 1, 2006, at 6B (noting the electoral advantage of Hispanic and Jewish-
sounding surnames in Florida judicial elections).
12. See Marie Hojnacki & Lawrence Baum, Choosing Judicial Candidates: How Voters
Explain Their Decisions, 75 JUDICATURE 300, 308-09 (1992) (noting voter reliance on low-
information cues, including gender of the candidates, in elections for associate justices of the
Ohio Supreme Court in 1986 and 1988).
13. In Texas, for example, several candidates with familiar-sounding names (e.g.,
George Busch, John Marshall, Sam Houston Clinton, Gene Kelly) have run for judicial office
on the strength of their names alone. See, e.g., Anthony Champagne, The Selection and Re-
tention of Judges in Texas, 40 Sw. L.J. 5302, 100-02 (1986); Charles Bleil, Can a Twenty-
First Century Texas Tolerate Its Nineteenth Century Judicial Selection Process?, 26 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 1089, 1092-94 (1995).
14. See Anthony Champagne, Tort Reform and Judicial Selection, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
1483, 1491 (2005) (discussing "'party sweeps' in which popular top-of-the-ticket candidates
have swept judges of the opposing party out of office and elected judges of a popular candi-
date's party for no other reason than that the judges shared the popular candidate's party
affiliation.").
15. See Jona Goldschmidt, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is Florida's Present Sys-
tem Still the Best Compromise?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 6 (1994); Griffin & Horan, supra
note 10, at 74; Baum, supra note 6, at 23 (noting the advantage of an incumbency designation
on the ballot).
16. See Griffin & Horan, supra note 10, at 73-74.
17. In the Matter of Judge Carven Angel, 31 FLA. BAR NEWS (Jul. 1, 2004); see also In
re Angel, 867 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 2004).
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The most potent example of bad information consists of candidates'
pronouncements about their personal positions on hot-button political issues.
Such pronouncements have multiplied in the wake of the Supreme Court's
decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,'8 which held that cer-
tain canons of the Code of Judicial Ethics do not prevent judicial candidates
from expressing their political views. 9 The impact of the White decision has
been hard felt. In the 2003-04 election cycle alone, candidates in Alabama,
Georgia, Kentucky, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania all
ran on expressly partisan or issue-oriented platforms. 2' Furthermore, even
where the candidates did not wish to make statements on issues that might
come before them on the bench, special interest groups have tried to force
their hands. During the 2006 campaign, such groups sent questionnaires to
judicial candidates in several states, asking the candidates to state their per-
sonal positions on a variety of controversial social issues, including abor-
tion, gay marriage and civil unions, capital punishment, assisted suicide, and
the display of the Ten Commandments in public buildings and schools. 2'
The surveys also posed a perennial favorite question to each candidate:
which Justice of the United States Supreme Court most reflects your judicial
philosophy? 2 Notably missing from the surveys were questions about the
candidate's relevant education, legal experience, or community service. It
was unsurprising, then, that the majority of candidates in Iowa and Florida
who received surveys declined to answer them, and the handful that did re-
spond in Iowa declined to answer questions concerning social issues, instead
encouraging voters to look to factors such as "the judge's knowledge of the
18. 536U.S. 765 (2002).
19. Id. at 787.
20. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 28-31.
21. These surveys were distributed with the half-hearted caveat that of course if the
candidate were elected, he would be expected to follow existing precedent. See, e.g., Iowans
Concerned About Judges, 2006 Judicial Voters' Guide Questionnaire for Judicial Candidates
(on file with author), available at
http://www.iowansconcemedaboutjudges.org/doc/Survey.pdf [hereinafter Iowa Question-
naire]; Florida Family Policy Council's 2006 Statewide Judicial Candidate Questionnaire,
http://www.flfamily.org/uploadfile/upload/FloridaFinal.pdf (last visited April 13, 2007)
[hereinafter Florida Questionnaire].
22. Iowa Questionnaire, Question 1; Florida Questionnaire, Question 6. This is a par-
ticularly silly question because even the most earnest answer to this question is likely to be of
little or no use to voters. A recent survey concluded that only 24% of Americans could name
even two Supreme Court justices. See New National Poll Finds: More Americans Know
Snow White's Dwarfs Than Supreme Court Judges, BusINESS WIRE, Aug. 14, 2006. At best, a
typical voter might recognize a justice's name and associate it with a broad assumption about
expected case outcomes (e.g., "Justice Scalia is conservative"). Accordingly, even if a judi-
cial candidate had a sophisticated, nuanced reason for wanting to emulate the style of, say,
Justice David Souter, such a response is highly unlikely to be appreciated by the voters he or
she is trying to reach.
2007]
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law, fairness, demeanor, timeliness of decisions, etc. 23 In the final analysis,
at best such surveys give voters no useful information on whether their judi-
cial candidates would be competent jurists, and at worst they inundate voters
with irrelevant information.
Even leaving the impact of White aside, contested judicial elections
have become indisputably partisan. Six states-Alabama, Illinois, Louisi-
ana, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia-initially select all of their
judges on partisan general election ballots; eight other states- -Florida, Indi-
ana, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, and Tennes-
see-select some portion of their judges that way.24 Nineteen other states
utilize so-called nonpartisan judicial elections, meaning that the candidate's
party affiliation is not listed on the general election ballot. But in some non-
partisan election states, candidates are still nominated by their parties for the
general election ballot. Furthermore, even if the ballots do not denote politi-
cal affiliation, the races themselves have become plainly politicized. In Ken-
tucky, for example, the news media openly discussed the party affiliation of
judges and judicial candidates during the 2006 election season, with the
clear implication that such affiliation influenced official action.25 Similarly,
Wisconsin's recent supreme court election had overtly partisan tones despite
its official nonpartisan designation.26
The dissemination of bad information in judicial elections, and the par-
tisan tone that has resulted, has been fueled largely by the money and re-
sources of political parties and special interest groups. The costs of judicial
elections have risen exponentially in the past twenty-five years, and this
growth has only accelerated since the turn of the century. In 2000, candidate
spending in the twenty states with supreme court races rose to almost $45.5
million, a 61% increase over the prior high, and spending set records in ten
23. Letter from Hon. Kurt L. Wilke, District Court Judge, Iowa Second Judicial District,
to Daniel Dlouhy, Iowans Concerned About Judges (Aug. 21, 2006) (on file with author),
available at http://www.iowansconcernedaboutjudges.com/doc/Wilke.pdf.
24. Some judges may be appointed to fill interim vacancies on the bench, but they must
then run on partisan ballots to retain their seats in the next election.
25. Joseph E. Lambert, Keeping Judicial Elections Respectable, BENCH & BAR (Frank-
fort, Ky.), Sept. 2006, at 4.
26. The Democratic Judicial Campaign Committee and the greater Wisconsin Commit-
tee, a Democratic-oriented special interest group, openly supported and financed one candi-
date, Linda Clifford. See Press Release, Justice at Stake Campaign, Special Interests the Only
Winners in Wisconsin's Record-Shattering Supreme Court Race (Apr. 3, 2007) (on file with
author). Clifford's opponent, Annette Ziegler, was characterized as a "rule of law" candidate
in contrast to Clifford, who was a "trial lawyer-backed ... liberal immigration attorney."
Press Release, American Justice Partnership, Reform Candidate Wins Resounding Victory
Over Trial Lawyer-Backed Opponent in Wisconsin Supreme Court Contest (Apr. 3, 2007)
(on file with author).
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states. 27 That year, interest groups in five states alone (Alabama, Illinois,
Michigan, Mississippi, and Ohio) collectively spent $16 million on hotly-
contested supreme court elections.28 From there, new spending records con-
tinued to be set: between 2000 and 2006, campaign contributions in the
twenty-two states using some form of contested elections to place judges on
the state's highest court have exceeded $150 million.29
More money means more television time, which in some cases has
translated into an increase in attack ads. The number of states experiencing
network television ads for highest court elections grew four-fold between
2000 and 2004,30 and only two states with contested elections have managed
to avoid broadcast television advertisements through the 2006 election
cycle. In 2004, more than $24 million was spent on television ads in highest
court races-one-fourth of all dollars raised by the candidates.31
In many parts of the country, candidates for judicial office must now
raise hundreds of thousands, or millions, of dollars to wage an effective
campaign. The sources of that money are troubling, because the funds put
pressure on the candidates to show favoritism to their contributors if they
ascend to the bench. Where money comes from political parties, a candidate
may feel pressured to decide cases in line with the party's agenda, especially
if she has to win a party primary in the next election cycle in order to ad-
vance again to the general election ballot.32 Where money comes from law
firms or individual lawyers, the judge may feel pressure to decide cases in
favor of the donors who appear before her, or (for high court justices) to
grant petitions for certiorari. Indeed, one study has already borne out this
fear: between 1994 and 1998, the Texas Supreme Court accepted 56% of
petitions for certiorari filed by attorneys who had donated $250,000 or more
to one or more of the justices, but only 5.5% of petitions from non-
contributing petitioners. 33 Even if an elected judge strives not to show favo-
ritism to donors, the perception of favoritism is inescapable.34
27. See Roy A. Schotland, To the Endangered Species List, Add. Nonpartisan Judicial
Elections, 39 WILLAMET-E L. REv. 1397, 1405 (2003).
28. See id.
29. Press Release, Justice at Stake Campaign, supra note 26.
30. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at vi.
31. Id.
32. See Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 1391, 1426 (2001).
33. Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial
Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 280 (2002).
34. Indeed, attorneys themselves may feel pressured to donate to campaigns in fear that
not doing so will adversely affect their clients should the candidate be elected. See Orrin W.
Johnson & Laura Johnson Urbis, Judicial Selection in Texas: A Gathering Storm?, 23 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 525, 549-50 (1992).
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Choosing judges based on cues unrelated to the candidates' relevant
skills and experience is fraught with danger and has disastrous, if predicta-
ble, results. A number of studies have concluded that choosing judges
through appointment or merit selection35 results in an overall higher quality
judiciary than choosing judges through contested elections.36 Some anecdot-
al evidence supports this proposition. In Texas alone, multiple judges have
been elected despite near universal acknowledgement that they were unqua-
lified. In 1976, a candidate named Don Yarbrough defeated a well-respected
judge with seventeen years of service in large part because Yarbrough had a
name that was very similar to a number of well known Texas politicians.
Yarbrough was indicted for perjury and forgery shortly thereafter and re-
signed in disgrace one year after taking the bench. 7 In the same state in
1994, a legislative landslide for the Republican Party carried a judicial can-
didate with no formal support and a criminal history to victory over a Dem-
ocratic incumbent with twelve years of judicial experience and near-total
35. Throughout this article, the term "merit selection" is used to refer to the judicial
selection process by which a nominating commission reviews the qualifications of judicial
candidates and presents a slate of the most qualified candidates to the governor or other ap-
pointing authority; the appointing authority selects one candidate from that slate and appoints
him or her to the bench; and the newly appointed judge periodically faces the voters in unop-
posed retention elections. "Merit selection" is the most common term for this process, al-
though it is also known as the "Missouri Plan" or the "Non-Partisan Court Plan." See gener-
ally RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND BAR
(1969). The author's use of the term "merit selection" here does not mean to imply that indi-
vidual judges selected by other means lack merit to hold their positions.
36. Judicial quality is not a clearly defined concept, and the several studies that have
tried to measure it have each measured "quality" in different ways. Regardless of how quality
is measured, however, many studies have concluded that a higher quality judiciary results
from merit selection programs. See Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is
There One "Best" Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 33 (1995) (comparing rates of discipli-
nary actions or removal for elected and appointed judges in Florida and New York); WATSON
& DOWNING, supra note 35, at 283-84 (finding that the average bar rating for appointed
judges in Missouri was higher than the average rating for elected judges, even though some
elected judges received very high ratings); Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, The Effect of
Judicial Independence on Courts: Evidence from the American States, 35 J. LEGAL STUD.
399, 399 (2006) (concluding that states initially settled by civil law countries and states that
were members of the Confederacy during the Civil War-mostly southern states employing
judicial elections-"granted less independence to their judiciary in 1970-1990 and had
lower-quality courts in 2001-2003"); F. Andrew Hanssen, The Effect of Judicial Institutions
on Uncertainty and the Rate of Litigation: The Election Versus Appointment of State Judges,
28 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 206 (1999) (measuring quality of courts by the level of judicial inde-
pendence, and concluding that independence is higher in states using appointive systems).
See also Norman Krivosha, Acquiring Judges by the Merit Selection Method: The Case for
Adopting Such a Method, 40 Sw. L.J. 15, 19 (1986) (discussing a poll of jurisdictions with
merit selection/ systems and noting that "[a]lmost without exception, the conclusion was that
the quality of the bench had improved by reason of a state adopting the merit selection sys-
tem.").
37. See Bleil, supra note 13, at 1092-93.
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support of the bar and the media.38 Similarly, in Illinois, a candidate was
elected to the Circuit Court of Cook County, even after it was disclosed in
federal court that he had been implicated in corrupt payments to judges in
that same county.39 According to another report, "in Minnesota a fresh law
school graduate with an arrest record for domestic violence" received over
100,000 votes for district court judge even though he ran against a highly
qualified and respected opponent, while in another election "an inexpe-
rienced candidate of questionable competence" nearly unseated a respected
sitting judge.4°
The spiraling cost of judicial elections has also directly impacted public
confidence in the courts. Nationwide, 76% of Americans agreed in a 2001
poll that campaign cash influences judicial decision-making. In Illinois,
that number was 87%,42 and in Pennsylvania, it was about 90%. 4" In Texas,
83% of all adults surveyed said they believed campaign contributions influ-
ence judicial decisions "very significantly or fairly significantly"-a number
which included 69% of court personnel and 79% of attorneys. 44 Even 48%
of Texas judges admitted that they believed money had an impact on judi-
cial decisions.45
Finally, the rapid infusion of money and partisan information into con-
tested elections has had adverse consequences not just for voters, but for the
judges they elect. Sandra Day O'Connor warned in her concurring opinion
in White that "if judges are subject to regular elections[,] they are likely to
feel that they have at least some personal stake in the outcome of every pub-
licized case" because they "cannot help being aware that if the public is not
satisfied with the outcome of a particular case, it could hurt [the judges']
38. See id. at n.15 and accompanying text.
39. See Darrell McGowen, Life Tenure-An Indispensable Ingredient to an Independent
Judiciary, 75 ILL. B.J. 620, 620-21 (1987).
40. League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund, Choosing Minnesota's
Judges (Aug. 1998) (on file with author), available at
http://www.lwvmn.org/EdFund/ChoosingMinnesotasJudges.asp.
41. Memorandum from Stan Greenberg, Chairman and CEO, Greenberg Quinlan Rosner
Research, and Linda A. DiVall, President, American Viewpoint, to Geri Palast, Executive
Director, Justice at Stake Campaign, concerning Justice At Stake Surveys of American Vot-
ers and State Judges (Feb. 14, 2002) (on file with author), available at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/Pollingsummary/FNAL.pdf.
42. The 87% figure includes statewide respondents who indicated that campaign contri-
butions influence decisions of Illinois judges "a lot," "quite a bit" or "some." See SURVEY
RESEARCH OFFICE, CTR. FOR STATE POLICY & LEADERSHIP UNIV. OF ILL. AT SPRINGFIELD
(UIS), ILLINOIS STATEWIDE SURVEY ON JUDICIAL SELECTION ISSUES, WINTER 2004-2005 23
(2005) (on file with author).





reelection prospects."46 That warning is playing out in courts across the
country, particularly in cases involving capital punishment and in-state
business interests. One lengthy study concluded that judges were much more
likely to impose the death penalty in states with contested elections than in
states with a merit selection system, who in turn imposed the death penalty
much more frequently than judges in states who did not have to face voters
at all.47 Another study of appellate courts in Texas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
and North Carolina concluded that "[d]istrict-based election, close margins
of victory, approaching end of term, conditioning from previous representa-
tional service, and experience in seeking reelection influence liberal justices
to join conservative majorities in death penalty cases. 48 One Georgia Su-
preme Court justice even admitted that the elected justices of that court may
have overlooked errors in some death penalty cases, leaving remedies to
federal habeas corpus petitions because federal judges have lifetime ap-
pointments and are more insulated from public disapproval.49 With respect
to tort claims, another study demonstrated that states with elected judiciaries
had damage awards against out-of-state businesses, which were about 40%
higher on average than in states with non-elected judiciaries, even though
awards against in-state companies were not significantly higher."°
Fortunately, the consequences of bad information (if not all the draw-
backs of contested judicial elections51) are susceptible to immediate remedy:
46. White, 536 U.S. at 788-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
47. See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Decid-
ing Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 759,
793-94 (1995). See also F. Andrew Hanssen, The Political Economy of Judicial Selection:
Theory and Evidence, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 413, 422-23 (2000) (reaching the same
conclusion that "[j]udges in elective systems respond more, on average, to political pressures
than do judges in [merit selection] systems," who in turn respond more to political pressures
than judges appointed for life).
48. Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts,
54 J. POLITICs 427, 442 (1992).
49. See id. at 799.
50. See Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort
Awards, 4 AM. L. & EcoN. REv. 341, 350 (2002).
51. Some of the problems with judicial elections cannot be resolved by additional in-
formation to voters, including unrestrained campaign spending and threats to minority voting
rights. In 1991, the Supreme Court held that state judicial elections fall within the ambit of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which prohibits the imposition of a voting qualification or
prerequisite in a manner that results in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote on ac-
count of race or color. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991); Houston Lawyers' Ass'n
v. Attorney Gen. of Texas, 501 U.S. 419 (1991). As a result, some states with judicial elec-
tions had to modify their judicial circuits and districts to assure that minority voting strength
was not unconstitutionally diluted. Some have also argued that contested elections are infe-
rior means of ensuring racial, ethnic, and gender diversity on the bench, although studies on
these topics have been inconclusive. See, e.g., Barbara Luck Graham, Do Judicial Selection
Systems Matter? A Study of Black Representation on State Courts, 18 AM. POL. Q. 316, 333
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an influx of credible, relevant information. One set of commentators has
explained, "The more knowledgeable voters are, the more tolerant of the
competing demands of judicial independence and democratic accountability
they become... [t]he task for those who wish to maintain balance between
accountability and responsibility may well be to increase the amount of in-
formation available to the ... electorate. 52 Voters concur. More than two-
thirds of voters in a 2004 poll agreed that "receiving a nonpartisan voter
guide containing background information on judicial candidates would
make them more likely to vote in judicial elections."53 Another poll of regis-
tered voters in New York found that an astonishing 88% "believe that voter
guides are a useful way to educate the public about judicial elections. 54 The
public has indicated that it is hungry for information. The challenge is to
feed that hunger with information that is nourishing and relevant.
II. EXISTING SYSTEMS OF EVALUATING JUDICIAL CANDIDATES
As long as states continue to choose judges through popular elections,
voters should be entitled to as much relevant information on each candi-
date's skills and experience as is available. Happily, the means to collect
and analyze such information already exist in most jurisdictions. Most states
already have a process for collecting data on potential judges when vacan-
cies occur on the bench, to assist the governor or other nominating authority
in selecting the best possible candidate. Nearly half the states also conduct
formal judicial performance evaluations for sitting judges, reviewing each
judge's performance on the bench against neutral criteria related to the
process of judging and in most cases disseminating that information to the
public. Where no official evaluation programs exist, state and local bar as-
sociations frequently conduct their own reviews of judges and judicial can-
didates which, while lacking the official imprimatur of state-run evaluations,
nonetheless provide some additional information to those who select judges.
(1990) (concluding that gubernatorial or legislative appointment is the superior method for
ensuring racial diversity on state trial courts); Robert C. Luskin et al., How Minority Judges
Fare in Retention Elections, 77 JUDICATURE 316, 320 (1994) (determining that there is no
significant difference between the retention rates of white, black, and Hispanic judges initial-
ly appointed under merit selection systems); Becky Kruse, Luck and Politics: Judicial Selec-
tion Methods and Their Effect on Women on the Bench, 16 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 67, 75-78
(2001) (noting conflicting studies concerning the success of women ascending to the bench in
appointive systems and elective systems, perhaps because the sample size is relatively small).
52. Charles H. Sheldon & Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr., Knowledge and Judicial Voting: The
Oregon and Washington Experience, 67 JUDICATURE 235, 244 (1983).
53. See Randall T. Shepard, Electing Judges and the Impact on Judicial Independence,
TENN. B.J. June 2006, at 25, n.16 (citing Zogby International Survey of 1,204 American
voters, commissioned by Justice at Stake and conducted March 17-19, 2004).
54. Feerick Commission Report, supra note 9, at 39.
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The information collected and analyzed by state commissions and bar asso-
ciations has proven beneficial to appointment authorities, as well as voters
in retention elections, and would be equally relevant to voters in the course
of a contested judicial election.
A. Judicial Performance Evaluation
Judicial performance evaluation programs have an established history
of providing relevant useful information to voters in judicial elections. Cur-
rently nineteen states, plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, have
formal JPE programs, in which sitting judges are periodically evaluated on
their performance on the bench.5 Several other states have unofficial evalu-
ation programs operated by state and local bar associations,56 and at least
one more was considering implementation of a formal evaluation program
in the near future.57 In many of these states, the collected information and
analysis is broadly disseminated to the public through the media and other
channels. In states where sitting judges face retention elections to stay in
office, dissemination of JPE results has led to an electorate that is more in-
formed and more confident in their votes.58
JPE programs have been used for more than thirty years. In 1975,
Alaska became the first state to adopt a formal JPE program,59 and in many
ways Alaska remains a model for the nation. Judges are evaluated at the end
of each term in office by the Alaska Judicial Council, a seven-member
commission consisting of three attorneys, three non-attorneys, and the chief
justice of the state supreme court.6° Judicial performance is evaluated by
looking at a broad and deep set of data. First, the Judicial Council surveys
professionals who interact with the judge on a regular basis (including
55. INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, SHARED
EXPECTATIONS: JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN CONTEXT Appendix A (2006) [hereinafter
SHARED EXPECTATIONS].
56. See id.
57. In Minnesota, a citizen commission chaired by former governor Al Quie recently
issued a report recommending that the state eliminate judicial elections in favor of a merit
selection system featuring nominating commissions, gubernatorial appointment, and retention
elections for judges. Central to the commission's proposal was the establishment of a Judicial
Performance Evaluation Commission and regular performance evaluations of all sitting
judges. See CITIZENS COMMISSION FOR THE PRESERVATION OF AN IMPARTIAL JUDICIARY, FINAL
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 16-20 (Mar. 26, 2007) (on file with author), available at
http://keepmnjusticeimpartial.org/FinalReportAndRecommendation.pdf.
58. See KEVIN M. ESTERLING & KATHLEEN M. SAMPSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION
EVALUATION PROGRAMS IN FOUR STATES: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 41 (1998).
59. See, e.g, id. at 23.
60. Press Release, Alaska Judicial Council, Retention Election Evaluation of Judges by
Judicial Council (June 27, 2006) at 2-3 (on file with author), available at
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/Retention2006/PressReleaseVote.pdf.
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members of the bar, peace and probation officers, social workers, guardians
ad litem, and court-appointed special advocates6 ), asking them to evaluate
the judge in nine areas of performance: legal ability; impartiality/fairness;
integrity; judicial temperament; diligence; special skills; respect for parties,
attorneys, and staff; reasonable promptness in issuing decisions; and overall
performance.62 Survey questions are tailored to the courtroom experience of
each group of respondents, and survey participants are requested to rate only
those judges for whom they have an actual basis for evaluation.63
Alaska similarly distributes surveys to its jurors and court staff. Jurors
are asked to evaluate the judge with whom they served in the areas of impar-
tiality, respectfulness, attentiveness, control over proceedings, intelligence
and skill as a judge, and overall performance. 64 Court staff are asked to eva-
luate the judge in five categories: judicial temperament, diligence, integrity,
impartiality, and overall performance.65
Beyond survey data, the Alaska Judicial Council examines how each
trial judge's rulings stand up on appeal,66 as well as detailed questionnaire
responses from selected attorneys who conducted trials before the judge,67
the judge's own self-evaluation,68 information gleaned from an interview
with the judge, the judges recusa 69 and peremptory challenge rates,
70 com-
61. See UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA ANCHORAGE BEHAVIORAL HEALTH RESEARCH AND
SERVICES, ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL RETENTION SURVEY 1 (2004) (on file with author).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2. Evaluations based on criteria other than direct professional contact (e.g.,
social contact or professional reputation) are accepted but are noted as such in the final eval-
uation. Most respondents do in fact base their responses on direct professional experience
with the judge.
64. See Memorandum from Alaska Judicial Council Members to Staff on Juror Survey
Report 4 (Apr. 17, 2006) (on file with author), available at
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/Retention2006/JurorSrvy06/JurorSurvey.pdf.
65. Memorandum from Alaska Judicial Council Members to Staff on Court Employee
Survey Report 5 (Apr. 17, 2006) (on file with author), available at
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/Retention2006/CrtEmpSurvey06/courtemp.pdf.
66. This review appears to be unique to Alaska, and the Judicial Council has acknowl-
edged that it might be difficult to measure properly (in part because issues may not be di-
vided out cleanly in appellate opinions). Still, the Judicial Council may take notice of a high
rate of rulings being overturned. See Memorandum from Alaska Judicial Council to Staff on
Appellate Evaluation of Judges Eligible for Retention in 2006 2 (Apr. 24, 2006) (on file with
author), available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/Retention2006/ApplReview06.pdf.
67. See Alaska Judicial Council, Retention Evaluation Information,
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/Retention/retent.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2007) [hereinafter Re-
tention Evaluation Information].
68. See id.
69. Memorandum from Alaska Judicial Council to Staff on Recusal Records for Judges
Eligible for Retention in 2006 1 (April 18, 2006) (on file with author), available at
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/Retention2006iPeremptoryChallenge06.pdf.
70. See Memorandum from Alaska Judicial Council to Staff on Peremptory Challenge
Rates for Judges Eligible for Retention in 2004 1 (May 26, 2004) (on file with author), avail-
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ments from public hearings,7 and reports from a sophisticated network of
volunteer judicial observers.72 Based on a careful review on the collected
information for each judge, the Judicial Council makes a recommendation as
to whether the judge should be retained. The recommendation, along with a
supporting narrative, is then disseminated to voters in advance of the judge's
retention election.
Several other states have adopted Alaska's general model, adjusting the
system to meet the specific needs of their respective voters. Rather than a
seven-member commission, for example, Arizona uses a statewide commis-
sion of up to thirty-four members, composed of lawyers, judges, and layper-
sons, which opens its evaluation meetings to the public.73 Colorado uses
both a statewide performance evaluation commission for appellate judges
and twenty-two local commissions for district and county judges.74 Colorado
also has statutory requirements concerning the appointment of members to
each ten-person commission: the Governor and Chief Justice each appoint
one attorney and two non-attorneys, and the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate each appoints one attorney and one non-attorney.75
The evaluation process also differs somewhat from state to state.76 For
example, Arizona and Colorado have express provisions which allow a
able at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/Retention04/disqual%202004.pdf. Because Alaska permits
one peremptory disqualification as of right in each case, the Judicial Council cautions that
peremptory challenge rates "should only be used as a signal of a potential issue with a judge,"
not necessarily a determinant of bias or other grounds for disqualification. See id. at 3; see
also Marla N. Greenstein, Judicial Disqualification in Alaska Courts, 17 ALASKA L. REv. 53,
61-62 (2000).
71. See Retention Evaluation Information, supra note 67.
72. The Alaska Judicial Observers compile annual results on each judge. Volunteer
observers are provided with approximately forty hours of training and are instructed to sit in
on court proceedings at unscheduled intervals. As many as fifteen observers are assigned to
each judge. They observe both civil and criminal cases, and review all courtroom activities,
from arraignments and motion hearings to jury trials. Observers provide both numerical eval-
uations and written comments in response to straightforward questions about the judge's
behavior, such as "Did the judge pay close attention to the testimony?" and "Did you under-
stand the judge's explanations and decisions, or did you leave feeling confused?" The data
from all observers is compiled into a one-page evaluation for each judge, which sets out the
number of observers, the total number of hours observed, the types of cases observed, and the
average rating the judge received in each category. See ALASKA JUDICIAL OBSERVERS 2006
BIENNIAL REPORT 1-8 (2006) (on file with author), available at
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/Retention2006/JudicialObservers.pdf
73. ARIZ. R. P. JUD. PERF. REv. 2(a) & (d).
74. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 13-5.5-102(1)(a), 13-5.5-104(l)(a).
75. COLO. Rv. STAT. § 13-5.5-102(l)(a).
76. For a more extensive discussion of innovations in different state JPE programs, see
Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, Using Judicial Perfornance Evaluations to Pro-
mote Judicial Accountability, 90 JUDICATURE 200, 203-06 (2007).
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judge to appeal the commission's finding." New Mexico expands its pool of
survey recipients to include, among others, law clerks and law professors
(for appellate judges) and courtroom interpreters and psychologists (for trial
judges).78 Furthermore, nearly all jurisdictions employing some form of
judicial performance evaluations require that the evaluation commission be
balanced by party affiliation, status as an attorney or a layperson, gender,
and/or the authority appointing members of the commission.7 9
Utah has instituted performance benchmarks for its sitting judges,
creating a clear threshold for acceptable judicial performance. Specifically,
each Utah judge is expected to meet or surpass each of the following stan-
dards: (1) a favorable rating by at least 70% of the respondents on at least
75% of the attorney survey questions; (2) for trial judges, a favorable rating
by at least 70% of the respondents on at least 75% of the juror survey ques-
tions; (3) compliance with rigid timing requirements for disposition of cas-
es; (4) at least thirty hours of judicial education a year; (5) substantial com-
pliance with the Code of Judicial Conduct; and (6) physical and mental fit-
ness for office.8" Compliance with the listed standards creates a presumption
that the judge will be certified for retention, rebuttable only by "reliable
information showing non-compliance with a performance standard," or
"formal or informal sanctions by the Supreme Court of sufficient gravity or
number or both to demonstrate lack of substantial compliance with the Code
of Judicial Conduct."'" Failure to meet all of the standards creates a pre-
sumption against certification, which "may be overcome by a showing of
good cause to the contrary."82 Utah and Arizona also decline to make expli-
cit recommendations on retention, instead providing voters with an analysis
77. See Colorado Commissions on Judicial Performance, Rules Governing Commissions
on Judicial Performance, Rule 15(b),
http://www.cojudicialperformance.com/main.cfm?webdiv=529&top=182 (last visited Apr.
13, 2007); A. John Pelander, Judicial Performance Review in Arizona: Goals, Practical
Effects and Concerns, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 643, 704 (1998).
78. See New Mexico Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission, How We Evaluate
Judges, http://nmjpec.org (follow hyperlinks under "How We Evaluate Judges" for informa-
tion on evaluation methods for each bench).
79. See, e.g., ARIZ. R.P. JUD. PERF. 2(a) & 5(a); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 13-5.5-102(1)(a)
13-5.5-104(l)(a); New Mexico Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission, Who Can
Serve on the JPEC?, http://www.nmjpec.prg/who (last visited Apr. 6, 2007); TENNESSEE
JUDICIAL EVALUATION COMMISSION, TENNESSEE APPELLATE JUDGES EVALUATION REPORT
2006 i (2006) (on file with author), available at
http://www.tba.org/judicialcampaign/judeval_2006.pdf.
80. See UTAH VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET (General Election Nov. 5, 2002) 60 (on





as to whether the judge meets acceptable standards for judicial perfor-
mance.
83
JPE programs, and in particular the widespread dissemination of evalu-
ation results to voters, have proven to have many benefits. A seminal 1998
study on four states with long-established JPE programs reported that the
majority of voters in those states made their retention election choices, at
least in part, on the basis of the performance evaluation information they
received. s4 The same voters agreed that the official information added to
their confidence in the quality of judicial candidates. 85 For this reason alone,
JPE is appropriate for sitting judges in every state with judicial elections.
JPE also benefits sitting and aspiring judges by publicly stating the criteria
by which their performance on the bench is to be evaluated, and by provid-
ing sitting judges with concrete, constructive feedback about their strengths
and weaknesses on the bench.
Furthermore, JPE is a prophylactic against the increasingly outcome-
directed tone of judicial elections. By its very nature, JPE focuses voters on
the criteria relevant to the act of judging, not the outcome of one or two cas-
es. While JPE does not inoculate all judges from partisan attacks, on the
whole it has shown the potential to reduce both their frequency and severity.
Indeed, the most notorious examples of efforts to remove sitting judges from
the bench-Rose Bird, Joseph Grodin, and Cruz Reynoso in California;86
David Lanphier in Nebraska;87 and Penny White in Tennessee 88---occurred
in states where official, formal evaluations of each judge's performance
were not available to voters at the time of the election.89
83. In Arizona, members of the performance commission publicly vote on whether each
judge "Meets" or "Does Not Meet" judicial performance standards. See ARIZ. R.P. JUD. PERF.
2(g)(1). In Utah, the commission merely certifies a judge for retention based upon perfor-
mance against the predetermined benchmarks. See UTAH VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET,
supra note 80, at 60.
84. The study polled voters in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado and Utah. Sixty-six percent of
those polled in Alaska responded that the official evaluation information they received as-
sisted or solely decided their vote; for Arizona, Colorado and Utah the figures were 66.1%,
76.3%, and 73.0%, respectively. See ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 58, at 39.
85. See id.
86. See generally John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices:
The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348
(1987).
87. See Traceil V. Reid, The Politicization of Retention Elections: Lessons from the
Defeat of Justices Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68, 69-72 (1999).
88. See id. at 69-72.
89. Without objective evaluations to point to, several of the justices struggled to find
resonant, nonpartisan campaign themes. Chief Justice Bird aggressively fought for her seat in
1986 by emphasizing the importance of judicial independence, a message that failed dramati-
cally with the voters. Bird's first election consultant later explained, "although polling indi-
cated that judicial independence was the one message that would not work, [Bird] adopted it
as the sole basis of her campaign." Wold & Culver, supra note 86, at 350; see also Bill Zim-
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B. Formal Evaluations for Judicial Nominees
JPEs are not the only existing mechanisms for measuring a would-be
judge's aptitude for the bench. Increasingly, states that fill mid-term vacan-
cies by gubernatorial or legislative appointment (including many states that
otherwise hold judicial elections) are recognizing the need for careful
screening and evaluation of judicial nominees before they are appointed. In
January 2007, New York Governor Eliot Spitzer signed an executive order
establishing judicial screening committees "to ensure that judicial officer
appointments are of the highest quality."9 The order created screening
committees at the state, departmental, and county levels, each charged with
actively recruiting candidates for appointment; reviewing and evaluating all
candidates' qualifications; recommending candidates for appointment who
are determined by the committee to be "highly qualified"; and preparing
written reports on the qualifications of each candidate determined to be
"highly qualified" for the governor's review.9 Screening committee mem-
bers are themselves selected by a range of appointing authorities, including
the governor, attorney general, chief judge of the court of appeals, other
judges, and members of the legislative leadership, thereby ensuring that
committees cannot be stacked by one branch of state government. 92 Com-
mittee members are explicitly instructed to give primary consideration to
each candidate's integrity, independence, intellect, judgment, temperament,
and experience, and they shall not give any consideration to the age, creed,
color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, disability, pre-
disposing genetic characteristics, marital status or political party affiliation
of the candidate.93
Within a few weeks of the New York order, Ohio Governor Ted Strick-
land similarly established the Ohio Judicial Appointments Recommenda-
tions Panel (OJARP) by executive action.94 The panel consists of five at-
large members appointed for two year terms. As vacancies open across the
merman, The Campaign That Couldn't Win: When Rose Bird Ran Her Own Defeat, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 1986, at V: 1 (arguing that "[t]o base a political campaign on the independence
of the judiciary was to commit electoral suicide."). Despite this failure, Justice White ran on
her own platform of judicial independence in 1996, with the same result. See Reid, supra
note 87, at 72. Justice Lanphier tried a different tactic in 1996, engaging in very little active
campaigning in order "to maintain the dignity of the office." But dignity did not win the day
in the face of partisan attack ads. See id.
90. Exec. Order No. 4 (Jan. 1, 2007) (on file with author), available at
http://www.ny.gov/govemor/executiveorders/exeorders/4.html.
91. Id.,§A.
92. See id., §§ A-B.
93. Id., § A(2)(b).
94. See Press Release, Office of the Governor, Strickland Establishes Judicial Appoint-
ments Recommendation Panel (Jan. 29, 2007) (on file with author).
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state, six members from each region with a vacancy open are appointed to
assist the at-large members.95 Although all members are appointed by the
governor, the panel is designed to reflect the opinions of lawyers and lay-
people, labor and business interests, as well as the state's diverse citizenry.96
The use of nominating commissions to fill vacancies in New York and
Ohio largely mirrors the use of similar commissions to propose judicial no-
minees in merit selection or traditional appointment states. In each state,
members of nominating commissions review the qualifications of candi-
dates, identify the top candidates for each open position, and forward their
analysis to the appointing authority so that he or she can make a more in-
formed judgment. Similar to JPE commissions, nominating commissions
across the country differ somewhat in their composition, but there is a gen-
eral consensus that they should reflect a cross-section of the population in
the state or district in which they serve. Accordingly, many states have ex-
plicit rules requiring representation-or even balance-on nominating
commissions with respect to party affiliation, attorney/non-attorney status,
gender, and sometimes race or ethnicity. 97
Also like their JPE counterparts, many judicial nominating commis-
sions establish specific criteria that must be (or must not be) considered in
evaluating whether an aspiring judge is qualified. California's Commission
on Judicial Nominees Evaluation, for example, evaluates all candidates on
the qualities "of impartiality, freedom from bias, industry, integrity, honesty,
legal experience, professional skills, intellectual capacity, judgment, com-
munity respect, commitment to equal justice, judicial temperament, commu-
nication skills, [and] job-related health." 98 In addition, trial court candidates
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.; see also COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 24(2)-(3) (requiring partisan balance); FLA.
STAT. § 43.291 (2006) (providing that "to the extent possible, the membership of the com-
mission reflects the racial, ethnic, and gender diversity, as well as the geographic distribution,
of the population within the territorial jurisdiction of the court for which nominations will be
considered"); Commonwealth of Massachusetts Exec. Order 466 § 1.1 (Feb. 15, 2005) (stat-
ing that "to the extent practicable, the [nominating] commissioners shall reflect diversity of
race, gender, ethnicity, geography and, among commissioners who also are members of the
bar, various practice areas and size of practice."); TENN. CODE ANN. 17-4-102 (2006) ("Each
speaker in making the appointments to the judicial selection commission shall appoint per-
sons who approximate the population of the state with respect to race, including the dominant
ethnic minority population, and gender.").
98. Rules and Procedures of the Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation, Rule II,
§ 6 (rev. June 23. 2005) (on file with author), available at
http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/public-comment/2005/JNERules.pdf. The California system
uses its nominating commission in a unique way. Rather than using the commission to identi-
fy and evaluate possible judicial candidates for the appointing authority's ultimate selection,
California allows the governor to identify his preferred nominee, whose name is then submit-
ted to the Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation for formal evaluation. See Deborah
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are evaluated on "decisiveness, oral communication skills, [and] patience,"
and candidates for the appellate bench are evaluated on "collegiality, writing
ability, [and] scholarship." 99 Hawaii explicitly sets out a similar list in the
rules for its Judicial Selection Commission. 00 Rhode Island likewise directs
its Judicial Nominating Commission to consider nominees' "intellect, abili-
ty, temperament, impartiality, diligence, experience, maturity, education,
publications, and record of public, community, and government service."' °
To this end, Rhode Island applicants are required to complete a detailed
written questionnaire setting forth their relevant educational and profession-
al history, financial, business, and community involvement, and history of
disciplinary conduct (if any).'
0 2
The practice of Colorado's nominating commissions illustrates a com-
prehensive evaluation and nominating process. Colorado adopted a merit
selection scheme for all of its judges in 1966.103 Mirroring the commission
structure for its JPE program, the state uses separate nominating commis-
sions for each of its twenty-two judicial districts, as well as a statewide no-
minating commission for selection of appellate judges. By design, each
commission has a minority of attorneys and a majority of non-attoreys. °
All commission members are provided with a handbook which identifies
"qualities of good judges," such as fairness and impartiality, appropriate
demeanor and temperament, legal knowledge and skill, character and repu-
tation, management ability, research and writing ability, collegial decision-
making, ability to manage docket and court personnel, and ability to deal
effectively with a wide variety of people.' °5 The handbook also sets out,
among other things, testimonials from sitting judges about the day-to-day
aspects of their jobs on the supreme court, court of appeals, urban and rural
district courts, and county courts. 1
06




100. See Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii, Judicial Selection Commission Rules,
Rule 10 (on file with author), available at http://www.state.hi.us/jud/ctrules/jscr.htm.
101. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-16.1-4 (2006).
102. See State of Rhode Island Judicial Nominating Commission, Personal Data Ques-
tionnaire for Candidates (on file with author), available at
http://www.state.ri.us/jnc/resources/pdq.pdf.
103. E.g., Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Judicial Merit Selection-A Well-Deserved
40th Anniversary Celebration, COLO. LAW. Apr. 2006, at 13.
104. See COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 24(1) & (2).
105. See COLORADO JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSION HANDBOOK 23-26 (1997) (on
file with author).
106. See id. at 27-35.
2007]
UALR LAW REVIEW
The commission reviews each judicial applicant's basic eligibility re-
quirements to hold the position (including whether the applicant need be an
attorney, and if so, for how long he or she must have been licensed to prac-
tice in the state); the applicant's employment history and professional and
community activities; letters of reference; and a short essay written by the
applicant explaining why he or she is seeking the particular judgeship."7
Commission members are instructed to find candidates with the intelligence,
experience, and flexibility to succeed on the bench:
It is rare to find an applicant with in-depth experience in all subject mat-
ters of the law, and you should be aware that many attorneys specialize
in a particular field of law. Specialization is not a disqualification and
may provide an expertise that is needed on the bench. Look for evidence
that the applicant is willing and able to learn the different substantive
areas of the law. Evaluate whether the applicant appears to be a quick
learner who can perform well under pressure.'
08
The Colorado commissions also interview selected applicants. Com-
mission members are encouraged to ask open-ended questions designed to
elicit the candidate's familiarity with the job duties, organization and
thought process, and any bias. For example, commissioners may ask, "What
sort of control do you feel a judge should exercise over his or her courtroom
and case load?" or ask the candidate to describe how he or she would "get
up to speed" in an area of law with which he or she was not already famili-
ar.
109
Ultimately, the commission selects nominees through a group decision-
making process in which all commissioners are permitted to voice their opi-
nions or concerns about a given candidate."0 The commission must evaluate
both the qualities of the applicants and the needs of the bench (such as the
court's workload and whether the open position has a significant administra-
tive component)."' The commission transmits a list of up to three nominees
to the governor, who conducts his own review and interviews of the nomi-
nees. The governor must choose one of the nominees within fifteen days of
receiving the commission's list." 2
Nominating commissions also reach out to the bar to collect relevant
information on prospective judges. The Alaska Judicial Council, for exam-
ple, polls members of the state bar as to their impressions of candidates for
107. Id. at 11-12.
108. Id. at 11.
109. Id. at 16.
110. Id. at 19.
111. COLORADO JUDICAL NOMINATING COMMISSION HANDBOOK 19 (1997) (on file with
author).
112. Id. at 20.
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nomination to the bench. Specifically, bar members are asked to rate each
candidate on a five-point scale on six criteria: professional competence, in-
tegrity, judicial temperament, fairness, suitability of experience, and overall
professional qualifications.' 3 Respondents must identify the level of profes-
sional contact they have had with the candidate and are encouraged (al-
though not required) to submit written comments. 1
14
Other states ask the state bar association to offer its own formal deter-
mination on each candidate's qualifications. In South Carolina, for example,
the Judicial Qualifications Committee of the state bar has the opportunity to
assess judicial candidates and provide feedback to the state Judicial Merit
Selection Commission." 5 The Judicial Qualifications Committee, consisting
of twenty-five active members of the bar, interviews each candidate and at
least thirty members knowledgeable about the candidate; evaluations are
based on whether the candidate meets established criteria and are posted on
the bar association's website. 16 Similarly, in California, before the governor
appoints or nominates a judge, the name is submitted to the state bar for
evaluation of the individual's qualifications." 7
On the federal level, for decades the American Bar Association has col-
lected information on candidates for the federal judiciary and has announced
recommendations on those candidates, ranging from "not qualified" to
"well-qualified." Like state nominating commissions, the ABA Standing
Committee on the Federal Judiciary evaluates a candidate in several areas of
integrity, professional competence, and judicial temperament.' Following
President Bush's nomination of Samuel Alito to the United States Supreme
Court in October 2005, the ABA Standing Committee contacted over 2000
individuals nationwide to survey their perceptions of then-Judge Alito's
professional qualifications. "9 In addition, three different reading groups
reviewed hundreds of the Judge's published and unpublished opinions, ar-
ticles, legal memos, and oral argument transcripts and briefs. 2° Three mem-
113. Alaska Judicial Council, Procedures for Nominating Judicial Candidates,
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/Selection/procedur.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
114. See id.
115. See S.C. Code Ann. § 2-19-25; see also Kimberly C. Petillo, The Untouchables: The
Impact of South Carolina's New Judicial Selection System on the South Carolina Supreme
Court, 1997-2003, 67 ALB. L. REV. 937, 940 (2004).
116. Kevin Eberle, Judicial Selection in South Carolina: Who Gets to Judge?, S.C. LAW.,
May-June 2002, at 23.
117. SeeCal. Gov'tCode 12011.5.
118. See, e.g., Letter from Stephen L. Tober, Chair, ABA Standing Committee on the
Federal Judiciary, to the Honorable Arlen Specter, Chair, Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
concerning nomination of Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to the Supreme Court (Jan. 9, 2006) at 2
(on file with author), available at http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/SCpage/Alito-letter.pdf.
119. See id. at 2-3.
120. See id. at 4.
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bers of the Standing Committee also interviewed the nominee directly.'
According to the Standing Committee, its ultimate evaluation of the nomi-
nee was "based upon a comprehensive, non-partisan, non-ideological peer
review of [his] professional qualifications," and did not take into account the
nominee's ideology or political views, or any of the nominee's views on any
issues that might potentially come before him on the bench.
122
Some state and local bar associations, as well as community organiza-
tions, have also disseminated evaluations of candidates in judicial elections
to fill the void left by the lack of official state evaluations. 123 The Pennsyl-
vania Bar Association Judicial Evaluation Commission, for example, con-
ducts evaluations of all candidates for appellate seats in each election cycle.
Each candidate is asked to complete a detailed "personal data questionnaire"
about his or her education, experience, professional and community service,
health, academic or teaching experience, and whether the candidate has been
subject to any personal or professional discipline. 124 The Commission also
interviews each candidate, as well as individuals who have had personal and
professional dealings with each candidate. Ultimately, each candidate is
rated as "Highly Recommended," "Recommended," or "Not Recommend-
ed.' 25 The ratings are based on ten criteria: legal ability; trial or other expe-
rience which ensures knowledge of courtroom procedures and evidentiary
121. See id. at 5.
122. Id. at 1-2. It is important to note that the ABA rating system has not been without
controversy. Although the Standing Committee has unanimously offered its highest recom-
mendation of "well-qualified" to both Democratic and Republican nominees for the U.S.
Supreme court in the last thirty years (including eight out of the nine sitting Justices), some
have charged that overall, its recommendations reflect a liberal bias. See, e.g., James
Lindgren, Yes, the ABA Rankings Are Biased, OPINION JOURNAL, Aug. 6, 2001,
http://www.opinionjoumal.com/extra/?id=95000927. In 2001, the Bush Administration an-
nounced that it would cease seeking an ABA rating on a judicial nominee before submitting
the nominee's name to Congress. See Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the Presi-
dent, to Martha W. Barnett, President, American Bar Association (Mar. 22, 2001) (on file
with author), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/print/20010322-5.html.
123. See, e.g., CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION JUDICIAL EVALUATION COMMITTEE,
GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL SELECTION, (2002), available at
http://www.chicagobar.org/public/attorney/judicial/guidelines.asp; Los ANGELES COUNTY
BAR ASSOCIATION, FINAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL ELECTIONS EVALUATION COMMIT-EE
(2004), available at http://www.lacba.org/showpage.cfin?pageid=3560; MUNICIPAL LEAGUE
OF KING COUNTY, ALL CANDIDATES, (2006),
http://www.munileague.org/cec/2006/report/alpha.htm.
124. The completed questionnaires for candidates in the 2007 election cycle are available
on the PBA website, http://www.pabar.org/public/committees/JEC/07ratings.asp (last visited
Apr. 12, 2007).
125. See PBA JUDICIAL EVALUATION COMMISSION'S EVALUATION PROCEDURES:
APPELLATE JUDICIAL CANDIDATE PROCEDURES (on file with author), available at
http://www.pabar.org/public/connittees/JEC/EvaluationProcedure.pdf.
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rules; a record of excellent character and integrity; financial responsibility;
judicial temperament; suitable mental and physical capacity; community
involvement; administrative ability; devotion to improving the quality of
justice and demonstrated sound professional judgment. 1
26
Reviewing the qualifications of aspiring judges helps assure a higher
quality judiciary. In 2000, the American Bar Association's Commission on
State Judicial Selection Standards concluded that "those jurisdictions that
were best able to achieve the goal of a 'qualified, inclusive and independent
judiciary' . . . were those that relied on a 'credible, deliberative body' to
review the qualifications of judicial candidates pursuant to recognized selec-
tion criteria. 127
III. THE VALUE OF PROSPECTIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
The expanding number of official nominating commissions and judicial
performance evaluation commissions nationwide illustrates a growing rec-
ognition that those who select judges (be they governors, legislators, or the
voting public) are entitled to the greatest amount of relevant information
available on each candidate. Prospective performance evaluation represent
the next logical outgrowth of that realization. In combination with JPE pro-
grams for sitting judges, PPE programs for candidates without prior judicial
experience would provide voters with a clear, concise, relevant, and widely
available source of information in contested judicial elections.
A. A Model for Prospective Performance Evaluations
A properly designed PPE program would consist of the following ele-
ments: (1) a conscientious evaluation commission whose membership is
representative of the demographics in the jurisdiction in which the candi-
dates are running; (2) an established procedure for collecting relevant data
on each candidate and clear criteria for evaluating the candidate; (3) guide-
lines for recommendations as to each candidate's degree of qualification for
the position sought; and (4) an organized means of disseminating the col-
lected information and recommendation on each candidate to voters in ad-
vance of the election.
126. See generally Pennsylvania Bar Association Evaluation Commission Ratings Crite-
ria (on file with author), available at
http://www.pabar.org/public/committees/JEC/RatingsCriteria.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
127. James J. Alfini & Jarrett Gable, The Role of the Organized Bar in State Judicial




The evaluation commission in a PPE program would be charged with
setting fair and appropriate criteria for evaluating judicial candidates, col-
lecting relevant information on all eligible candidates, evaluating that in-
formation in light of the predetermined criteria, and disseminating the col-
lected data and the commission's own analysis on each candidate to the pub-
lic in advance of judicial elections. As an initial matter, however, the com-
mission itself must be composed in a manner that both maximizes the like-
lihood of a fair evaluation for every judicial candidate and simultaneously
promotes public confidence in the evaluation system. Prior experience with
nominating and judicial performance evaluation commissions suggests that
both the perception and reality of fair evaluations are enhanced when the
commission is balanced between attorneys and non-attorneys, along partisan
lines, and in the manner in which members are appointed to the commission.
Attorneys (and other legal professionals) should be represented on the
commission in roughly equal proportion to laypersons. Attorneys provide
necessary expertise on the court system, the role of the judge, and neutral
measures for evaluations. At the same time, non-attorneys provide insight
into the concerns of the general public and are apt to raise questions that
may elude those already entrenched in the judicial system. Furthermore, the
mere presence of non-attorneys on the commission may cause the public to
see prospective performance evaluations as something more than an exercise
by legal insiders, thereby creating greater public confidence in the system." 8
Partisan balance is similarly important. A commission that has ba-
lanced representation between political parties is more likely to put a judi-
cial candidate's political affiliation aside and focus on his or her politically
neutral qualifications. As a simple example, consider a ten-member com-
mission composed of eight Democrats and two Republicans. The Democrats
on the commission might be tempted to give higher ratings to all candidates
with Democratic affiliations, or at least put an extra thumb on the scale,
knowing that they could outvote Republican partisans on the commission.
(Obviously the same possibility exists with a commission composed of eight
Republicans and two Democrats). If the partisan split were five and five,
however, even the most ardent partisans would recognize that they could not
outvote the other party in their recommendations, and would presumably
move on to other, more relevant, considerations of judicial excellence. Put
simply, partisan balance reduces the opportunity for partisan mischief.29
Finally, there should be at least rough balance among the authorities
who appoint members to the evaluation commission. A commission whose
128. See SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 55, at 82.
129. Id.
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membership is appointed by a variety of authorities-say, the governor,
legislative leaders, bar associations, the courts and community groups-is
more likely to be perceived as cautious and balanced than a commission
appointed entirely by one person, particularly if that person is also the ap-
pointing authority for the state's judges. 3'
Depending on the size of the commission and the pool of potential
commission members, other forms of diversity on the commission may also
be desirable. Several studies of nominating commissions have suggested
that a diverse commission is more likely to avoid making recommendations
that favor a particular race, religion, or gender,13 1 and the same principles
would appear to apply equally well to prospective performance evaluation
commissions. Likewise, a growing trend is the deliberate inclusion of repre-
sentatives from different community interests on evaluation commissions.
Ohio's new nominating commission for judicial vacancies, for example,
includes seats for both labor and business interests.13 A recent proposal by
Governor Edward Rendell in Pennsylvania would assign seats on a state
nominating commission for representatives of civic organizations, organized
labor, the business community, non-legal professionals, law school deans,
and public safety organizations. 33 In states and localities where it is politi-
cally expedient to involve certain community interest groups, creative ba-
lancing such as that currently being attempted in Ohio and Pennsylvania can
be accomplished to assure wide representation on the PPE commission.
2. Evaluation Criteria
Whether a fresh face on the court or a long-term veteran, a judge is ex-
pected to bring the same set of skills to the courtroom. Accordingly, all judi-
cial candidates should be evaluated on a comprehensive set of criteria re-
lated to the process of judging. These criteria include, at a minimum: (1) the
candidate's command of relevant substantive law and procedural rules for
the position he or she is seeking; (2) the candidate's historical ability to treat
others in professional and personal settings in a manner free from bias, and
to avoid impropriety or the appearance of impropriety; (3) the candidate's
ability to express him-self or herself clearly, both orally and in writing; (4)
the candidate's demonstrated demeanor in the courtroom and other profes-
sional settings; (5) the candidate's ability to be prepared for hearings, meet-
130. See, e.g., Norman L. Greene, Perspectives on Judicial Selection, 56 MERCER L. REv.
949, 963-64 (2005).
131. See Malia Reddick, Merit Selection: A Review of the Social Scientific Literature, 106
DICK. L. REv. 729, 730-32 (2002) (discussing various studies).
132. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
133. See To Improve Accountability, Governor Rendell Unveils Historic Reform Propos-
al, PRNEWSWIRE, Mar. 26, 2007.
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ing, trials, and other events, to meet deadlines, and to use court time effi-
ciently; and (6) the candidate's commitment to public service. These criteria
mirror those typically used by nominating commissions to select potential
judges for appointment by a state governor or legislator, and by evaluation
commissions to ascertain whether a sitting judge should be recommended
for retention.134
3. Methods of Collecting Data
While evaluation criteria may be the same for sitting and prospective
judges, the actual information that must be collected is somewhat different.
Obviously, a candidate who has not served on the bench cannot be reviewed
on his or her control over a courtroom. However, wholly adequate analogues
for judicial activity can be measured in law practice, and nearly all candi-
dates without judicial experience have been engaged in the practice of law
prior to their candidacy.'35 The data collected on candidates with legal but
not judicial experience might include:
a information confirming the candidate's statutory and constitutional
eligibility for office;
* a listing of the candidate's relevant work experience and participa-
tion in professional and civic activities;
* review of the candidate's ongoing standing to practice law in every
jurisdiction to which he has been admitted, including an inquiry as to
whether the candidate has ever been charged with a violation of applicable
codes of professional conduct;
* evaluation of selected submissions to the court, including a variety of
motions and briefs, or if the candidate is not a litigator, a similar example of
high-quality written material;
* review of the candidate's ability to meet case management prin-
ciples, including the number of times the candidate has requested conti-
nuances or discovery extensions on behalf of a client, and the reasons given
therefore;
* public comments about the candidate's skills and abilities related to
the process of judging;
" one or more interviews with the candidate;
" surveys of members of the bar, and in particular attorneys who have
worked with or on the opposite side of the candidate in recent cases or
transactions; and
134. See SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 55, Appendix J.
135. Nearly every state requires that judges be admitted to practice law in the state, be
members of the state bar association, or both. See SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 55,
Appendix A.
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* surveys of non-attorneys who have interacted with the candidate in
courtroom, mediation, deposition, or transactional settings, including judges,
mediators, arbitrators, court and law firm staff, stenographers, experts, and
perhaps jurors and lay witnesses.
Surveys are an important component of prospective performance eval-
uations and are deserving of special mention. All surveys should be de-
signed to be scientifically valid and should be sent to a large enough sample
to allow the commission to draw reasonable conclusions from the informa-
tion gleaned. The commission should endeavor to maximize the number of
valid survey responses by making it as easy as possible to return the survey
instrument (perhaps by allowing respondents to complete the survey online)
and by sending reminders to survey recipients who do not respond by a set
deadline. Survey responses should be anonymous and, ideally, should be
tabulated by an independent party, with results sent to the commission. 3 6 If
the design of the survey permits individual written responses, those res-
ponses should also be collected by an independent entity to prevent the pos-
sibility that the respondent will be identified.
Surveys should also be tailored to the specific knowledge of desired
respondents. Members of the bar, judges, and arbitrators might be asked to
identify the types of cases (e.g., civil, criminal, domestic) and/or settings
(e.g., trial, hearing, conference, deposition, transaction) in which they inte-
racted with the candidate, as well as their perceptions about the candidate's
preparation for hearings or trial, the clarity of his or her oral and written
advocacy, and his or her mastery of the relevant rules of procedure and
substantive law. 137 Court staff might be asked about the candidate's treat-
ment of others in the courtroom and compliance with technical court rules.
Each survey should ask multiple questions addressing each of the six
process-oriented criteria for evaluation-knowledge of law and procedure,
integrity and freedom from bias, clarity of communication, professional
demeanor, administrative capacity and preparation, and commitment to pub-
lic service. 3
136. In JPE programs, assuring the anonymity of survey respondents has been essential.
Many respondents, particularly attorneys, are more comfortable responding anonymously
because doing so reduces the risk that the judge will hold negative comments against them or
their clients. See Todd D. Petersen, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era
of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 41, 107 (1995). Anonymity also tends to
result in more valuable and complete feedback. See Seth S. Andersen, Judicial Retention
Evaluation Programs, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1375, 1377 (2001).
137. For an example of a model survey designed to capture this type of information, see
SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 55, at Appendix E.
138. Here the contrast with the outcome-oriented questionnaires that have proliferated
since the White decision should be evident. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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For the rare occasion where a judicial candidate is not an attorney or
sitting judge, the evaluation commission should strive to collect information
on the candidate in as similar a form as possible. For example, surveys for
candidates from the business community may be tailored to reach out to the
candidate's customers, employees, and competitors, and surveys for profes-
sors might target (among others) the candidate's students and academic
peers. The commission should endeavor to give each candidate a fair and
comprehensive evaluation within the six set criteria discussed above; if
some information is simply unavailable (for example, if the candidate does
not engage in a profession with any significant writing component), the
commission should take into account whether that lack of information is
anomalous or whether it truly reflects the candidate's level of preparation to
hold a judgeship. Ultimately, of course, the goal of prospective performance
evaluations is to help voters distinguish between unqualified, excellent, and
outstanding judicial candidates; if a candidate simply lacks the relevant ex-
perience to hold judicial office, the commission must not be afraid to point
that out to the voters.
4. Recommendations
Finding qualified candidates is not a purely objective process; there is
no algorithm that will produce the one perfect candidate for all seats on the
bench. A balanced and conscientious evaluation commission, guided by set
criteria and relevant information on the candidates, however, should be able
to assess the candidates in a meaningful way. The commission may choose
to affix one of four final recommendations to each candidate:
* Highly qualified-The candidate has the requisite skills, experience,
temperament, administrative capacity, knowledge, and commitment to pub-
lic service to be an outstanding judge, and that skill set is commensurate
with the specific judicial position he or she seeks.
* Qualified-All criteria indicate that the candidate would be a com-
petent judge, but the candidate's skill set is not among the highest echelon
of potential judges.
* Not qualified-The candidate lacks at least one of the requisite
skills, temperament, administrative capacity, knowledge, or commitment to
hold the judicial office that he or she seeks.
e Not yet qualified-The candidate may have promising skills and
ability, but lacks requisite experience to hold judicial office at the current
time.
This proposed rating scale is meant to review candidates solely in
terms of their ability to discharge the specific office they seek. The commis-
sion need not rank the candidates relative to each other, or assign only one
candidate a certain rating. In other words, if multiple candidates running for
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the same seat are all highly qualified, the commission should not hesitate to
offer that recommendation for all of them. Likewise, if all candidates are not
qualified for a position, the commission should not feel tempted to inflate
their recommendations. Similarly, there is no set model of a "highly quali-
fied" or "not qualified" candidate. An attorney with twenty years of trial
experience may be highly qualified for a trial court position, while a though-
tful, active law professor may be highly qualified for an appellate seat. Simi-
larly, a candidate may be deemed "not qualified" because of one significant
flaw (e.g., demonstrated racial or gender bias) or because the whole of the
candidate's qualifications are simply subpar. In any event, the evaluation
commission's recommendations should be limited to the candidate's degree
of qualification; the commission should not recommend that voters choose
one candidate over another.
5. Dissemination of Information
Ultimately, the commission's work is of little use unless it is widely
disseminated to the public in a form that can be easily digested and used.
The challenge is that different segments of the public absorb and digest in-
formation in different ways. Accordingly, the commission should develop
both short-form and long-form reports for public consideration. Short-form
reports should be designed for newspapers and voter guides, and should
include a summary of the survey data and the candidate's strengths and
weaknesses, a narrative containing the candidate's biography, and the com-
mission's recommendation on the candidate's qualifications. 39 Long-form
reports should set out the survey results and other collected data more com-
prehensively and should be made available on the internet (through an offi-
cial commission website) and in hard copy. Both long and short-form re-
ports should set out the methodology adopted for evaluation, and the criteria
used to evaluate each judicial candidate. 40 Finally, comprehensive public
information campaigns should be developed to urge voters to learn about the
judicial candidates prior to election day and to inform voters that evaluation
results will be available in voter guides, newspapers and other media outlets,
and on the internet. 141
139. See SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 55, at 90.
140. Id.
141. Id. See also Alaska Judicial Council, Jay Hammond on Judicial Evaluations,
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/Retention0O/retgen00.htm (containing an audio file of a radio
advertisement designed to encourage voters to review ME results before the election).
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B. Addressing Objections to Prospective Performance Evaluations
Change is never easy, even when the problem to be solved is well-
known. 4 2 Perhaps the most significant barrier to prospective performance
evaluations is the belief that candidates who lack judicial experience cannot
be evaluated in the same way as sitting judges. It is true that some candi-
dates cannot be measured specifically on their past performance on the
bench. The evaluation criteria, however, are identical; no matter how much
prior judicial experience a candidate has, he or she is expected to demon-
strate excellent legal knowledge, integrity, temperament, communication
skills, administrative capacity, and commitment to public service. It is no
coincidence that nationwide, nominating commissions use the same criteria
to evaluate new judges as RE commissions use to evaluate sitting judges.
Another potential concern about prospective performance evaluations
is that they will not live up to their nonpartisan promise. If the evaluation
commission is itself partisan or otherwise biased, voters may be presented
with officially neutral information that in fact favors a candidate for reasons
other than that candidate's process-directed qualifications. This is a legiti-
mate concern, but it has been addressed successfully in states with nominat-
ing and/or judicial performance evaluation commissions. As discussed
above, a thoughtfully constructed PPE commission will reflect partisan bal-
ance, which is likely to lessen the probability of analyses becoming infected
with partisan considerations. Concerns about a "runaway commission" mak-
ing recommendations on improper grounds can also be alleviated by estab-
lishing guidelines for rating candidate qualifications.
Yet another possible objection is the cost of prospective performance
evaluations. The expense of conducting such evaluations, however, is far
less than it might initially appear. If service of the evaluation commission is
made sufficiently important and prestigious, members are more likely to
serve on a volunteer basis. The expense of disseminating the information
can also be kept down by employing existing media, voter guides, and the
internet. Full-time staffing need not be more than a few persons at most.
And even distributing, retrieving, and compiling surveys-typically one of
the greatest expenses-can be accomplished for the cost of a few thousand
dollars per candidate, or less than 1% of what might be spent on election
advertising in a heated judicial race."'
142. "[T]here is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more
uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things."
NIccoLo MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 23 (Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. trans., Univ. of Chi. Press
1985) (1513).
143. Virginia estimated its "average" cost of evaluating its sitting judges to be approx-
imately $3400 per judge, which included travel and meeting expenses, copying and printing
costs for surveys, mailing costs for distribution and return of surveys, independent consulting
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Other barriers to implementation of robust prospective performance
evaluations are more philosophical. Some have argued, for example, that
cues such as the candidate's party affiliation are beneficial to voters in mak-
ing their choices because party designation serves as a sufficiently accurate
shorthand for the judge's philosophy.'" Taking that argument a step further,
others have asserted that it is in fact hopelessly naYve to divorce a judicial
candidate from her politics, because judges are political animals and in ef-
fect do legislate from the bench.'45 The candor associated with this sort of
advocacy is impressive, the arguments less so. The notion of the judge as a
politician and high-level policymaker likely has little resonance for individ-
ual litigants, whose primary concern is a fair opportunity to argue their cases
before unbiased jurists. 146 Even if there is a visceral appeal to electing judges
whose policy preferences correlate with one's own, virtually no one wants a
day in court in front of a judge who has already made up his or her mind.
Furthermore, in some cases a candidate's party affiliation may not reflect a
particular philosophy at all, but rather the political reality of the jurisdiction.
For example, in 1985, Dallas County, Texas District Judge Richard Mays
abruptly changed his party affiliation from Democratic to Republican, ex-
plaining, "My political philosophy about general things has nothing to do
with me being a judge. That's not the reason I'm switching parties. The rea-
son I'm switching is that to be a judge in Dallas County you need to be a
Republican."' 47
Another argument rests on democratic theory. Individuals and institu-
tions should be permitted to engage fully in the democratic process, which
means (among other things) actively funding and promoting their judicial
candidates within constitutional limits and allowing all eligible candidates to
run free of government interference. Based on this argument, prospective
performance evaluations threaten vibrant democratic participation because
to tabulate survey results, staffing, training and travel expenses for facilitator judges and
courtroom observers, and compiling lists of attorneys and jurors. See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION TASK FORCE SUBMITTED TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
36-39 (2001) (on file with author), available at
http://www.courts.state.va.us/publications/judicialperf ormance-eval task force rep ort.pdf.
JPE programs in other states have been even less expensive. See SHARED EXPECTATIONS,
supra note 55, at 63--64.
144. See David W. Adamany, The Party Variable in Judges' Voting: Conceptual Notes
and a Case Study, 63 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 57, 72 (1969) (concluding that voters "should
choose candidates with whom they share a party preference since party affiliation is a good
forecaster ofjudicial conduct.").
145. See, e.g., Mark C. Miller, A Comparison of the Judicial Role in the United States
and in Canada, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, 17 (1998).
146. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 106 (1990) (explaining that
the legitimacy of the courts in the public eye is strengthened over time when individual liti-
gants perceive that their courtroom experience was fair).
147. Champagne, supra note 14, at 80.
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evaluation results will have the imprimatur of the government telling its
citizens how to vote. As long as evaluations do not overtly recommend a
specific candidate, however, they are no more offensive to democratic par-
ticipation than fiscal impact statements for ballot initiatives, which are readi-
ly included in some voter guides. 4 '
Finally, prospective performance evaluations are likely to be resisted
by some judicial candidates, either on philosophical grounds (opposition to
evaluations of any sort) or more pragmatic ones (fear of exposing the candi-
date's own questionable qualifications). Candidate participation, however, is
not a necessary condition to the success of the evaluation process. While
candidate support of evaluations is certainly beneficial, nearly all evaluation
data can be collected and analyzed even if the candidate does not cooperate,
and voters may draw their own conclusions from a candidate's refusal to
participate directly in the evaluation process. Furthermore, even if some
candidates are not evaluated at all, asymmetrical information on the entire
slate of candidates would still be more preferable than forgoing evaluation
entirely. One commentator has noted, "one must be mindful that the purpose
of [judicial evaluation] programs is to provide voters with information upon
which to base their vote. If some information is better than no information,
then the delivery of information on only one candidate, so long as such in-
formation is reliable, does provide assistance to the voter." 149
C. Anticipated Benefits of Prospective Performance Evaluations
States' previous experience with both nominating commissions and
judicial performance evaluations strongly suggests that the application of
JPE and PPE to contested judicial elections would generate a more informed
voting public. At a minimum, such evaluations would serve voters who are
already seeking credible, relevant information on judicial candidates, allow-
ing them to cast a more informed vote. Moreover, if evaluation results are
properly disseminated to the public with adequate time before the election,
they are apt to inform a much larger segment of the voting population, help-
ing voters determine the qualities of various judicial candidates, increasing
voter confidence, and perhaps increasing voter participation at the polls. 5°
148. See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY, ANALYSIS
OF THE 2006 BALLOT PROPOSALS (Research Pub. No. 554) 16 (2006) (on file with author),
available at http://www.state.co.us/gov dir/leg dir/lcsstaff/Bluebook/BlueBook2006.pdf
(setting out the estimated fiscal impact of a proposed change to the state constitution regard-
ing property tax reduction for disabled veterans).
149. David C. Brody, The Relationship Between Judicial Performance Evaluations and
Judicial Elections, 87 JUDICATURE 168, 172-73 (2004).
150. In one study of four states in which official evaluation information was made availa-
ble to voters, between 64% and 72% of voters in each state agreed or strongly agreed with the
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The existence of prospective performance evaluations is also more
likely to discourage unqualified or marginally qualified candidates from
seeking judicial office because fundamental defects in their knowledge, ex-
perience, or temperament are likely to be exposed well before the election.
A familiar-sounding name or even a popular party affiliation is far less po-
werful with voters if accompanied by hard data and a narrative evaluation
demonstrating that the candidate is simply not qualified to preside over a
wide range of cases. Broad dissemination of the evaluation criteria would
also serve as a guideline for expectations once victorious candidates took the
bench.
Of course, prospective performance evaluations alone are unlikely to
change fully the dynamic of judicial elections. Larger issues of money, par-
tisanship (officially sanctioned or otherwise) and special interests will con-
tinue to play a central role as long as states continue to elect all or part of
their judiciaries. But at its best, PPE has the broad potential to change the
way the public thinks about judges. By emphasizing process-oriented meas-
ures of judicial performance, and diminishing the importance of individual
case outcomes and party affiliations, prospective performance evaluations
help frame the discussion about judicial activity in terms consistent with the
constitutional expectation of three separate, co-equal branches of govern-
ment. Judges are seen as interpreters of law, not creators, and as resolvers of
disputes, not participants in a larger political drama. The promise of pros-
pective performance evaluations as an educational tool therefore extends
beyond informing voters in individual elections to helping the public, and
judges, internalize expectations about the proper role of the judge.
statement: "I am more likely to vote in a judicial election because of the official information."
ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 58, at 41. See also Cynthia Canary, Know Before You Go:
A Case for Publicly Funded Voters' Guides, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 81, 87 (2003).
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